## Bayesian Inference in Cosmology

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CosmoBack, Marseille

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## Overview

#### Parameter Inference

- The posterior *p*(*parameters*|*data*)
- Gaussian likelihoods
- Data compression
- Non-gaussian likelihoods
- Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC)

## Bayesian Hierarchical Models (BHM)

### 3 Model Comparison

- Do the data favour ΛCDM?
- The future: what are the prospects to falsify ACDM?

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- What is the relative probability of ACDM compared with alternatives? [Model Comparison]

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- Dropping *M* dependence for now (we will return to it when we discuss Model Comparison):

$$p( heta|d) = rac{\mathcal{L}(d| heta)\pi( heta)}{p(d)}$$

## The Posterior

# $p(\theta|d, M)$

If you just try long enough and hard enough, you can always manage to boot yourself in the posterior. A.J. Liebling.

# It is all probability

#### The Posterior

Everything is focussed on getting at  $p(\theta|d)$ .

#### Computing the posterior

 $p(\theta | \mathsf{d}) \propto \mathcal{L}(\theta) \pi(\theta).$ 

#### We need to make some choices:

What are the data, d? What is the likelihood function  $\mathcal{L}(d|\theta)$ ? What is the prior  $\pi(\theta)$ ?

# Priors

Bayesian: prior = (usually) the state of knowledge before the new data are collected.

For parameter inference, the prior becomes unimportant as more data are added and the likelihood dominates.

For model comparison (see later), the prior remains important. Issues:

• Sometimes one wants an 'uninformative' prior, but what does this mean?

# Priors


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- Subjective vs Objective Bayesians

# Priors



Subjective Bayesians, uninformative priors, and reparametrisation

• **Subjective Bayesian:** specify the prior first, independently of the experiment you are about to do.


Subjective Bayesians, uninformative priors, and reparametrisation

- **Subjective Bayesian:** specify the prior first, independently of the experiment you are about to do.
- 'Flat' or 'uniform' priors: A common and apparently reasonable 'uniformative' prior is  $\pi(\theta) = \text{constant}$ .

## Uninformative prior


A flat prior seems natural, but consider this problem. Imagine cartesian coordinates in N dimensions, with the prior range being  $\left(-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)$  for all coordinates. The prior probability of being inside the N-sphere which just fits inside the prior volume is

$$\frac{\pi^{N/2}}{2^N\Gamma(1+N/2)}$$



# Uninformative?

Probability of being inside the N-sphere vs N:



An apparently uninformative prior may be *highly informative* when viewed a different way.

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- Jeffreys Priors sometimes do not generalise well to multidimensional problems. But sometimes they do - e.g. neutrino masses in oscillation and cosmological experiments,

 $\pi(m_1, m_2, m_3) \propto m_1 m_2 + m_1 m_3 + m_2 m_3$  (Heavens & Sellentin 2018).

#### Data compression

We do not usually compute the probability of all the measured data, since the number of these may be large (e.g. Planck has  $\sim 10^{12}$  time-ordered data). We compress them, e.g. to a map, or a power spectrum.

#### Summary Statistics

Typical summary statistics: correlation function or power spectrum estimates. Already a massive data compression. Perhaps  $10^2 - 10^4$  summary statistics for Euclid or LSST.

## Likelihood

Gaussian Likelihood

### Gaussian Likelihood

Often, we assume that the summary statistics are gaussian-distributed (Handwave, handwave, central limit theorem  $\ldots$ )

### Is a Gaussian likelihood appropriate?

We rarely stop to question this, but we should. Let us run with it for now

#### Gaussian Likelihood

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{d}|\theta) = |2\pi\Sigma|^{-1/2} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{d}-\mu)^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1}(\mathbf{d}-\mu)\right]$$


 $\mu(\theta)$  is the mean signal, obtained from theory or simulation.  $\Sigma$  is the covariance matrix. It may depend on  $\theta$ . It is a problem (except for Gaussian fields such as the CMB).

# Sampling

#### MCMC

If we know  $\Sigma$ , we need to evaluate the posterior as a function of parameters  $\theta$ . Not trivial if there are  $\sim 10$  parameters. Standard technique is MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo), where steps are taken in parameter space, according to a proposal distribution, and accepted or rejected according to the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. This gives a chain of samples of the posterior (or the likelihood).

#### MCMC example



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
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- However, Σ<sup>-1</sup> is not unbiased. A fix is the Hartlap et al (2007) correction: multiply by (N 1)/(N n 2), where n = number of data; N = no. of sims.
- $\textcircled{O} \text{ Better: marginalise over true } \Sigma \rightarrow \text{likelihood of Sellentin \& Heavens} (2016)$

## Covariance Matrices matter

e.g. KiDS weak lensing result (on  $S_8 = \sigma_8 \sqrt{\Omega_m/0.3}$ ) shifts by  $1\sigma$  when changing from an analytic to a simulated covariance matrix (Hildebrandt et al 2017).





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### **Covariance Matrices**

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- If Σ varies with cosmological parameters (as it will), then it is worse.
   Estimating Σ would be prohibitively expensive
- **9** Solution: reduce *n*. More radical data compression

## Data Compression

MOPED algorithm

#### MOPED

Massively Optimised Parameter Estimation and Data compression (Heavens et al. 2000). See also Zablocki & Dodelson (2016), Alsing & Wandelt (2018), Charnock et al (2018).

#### Linear compression (note $C = \Sigma$ ):

$$y_{\alpha} = b_{\alpha} \cdot d$$

$$\begin{split} \mathbf{b}_{1} &= \frac{\mathbf{C}^{-1}\boldsymbol{\mu}_{,1}}{\sqrt{\boldsymbol{\mu}_{,1}^{T}\mathbf{C}^{-1}\boldsymbol{\mu}_{,1}}}\\ \text{and} \\ \mathbf{b}_{\alpha} &= \frac{\mathbf{C}^{-1}\boldsymbol{\mu}_{,\alpha} - \sum_{\beta=1}^{\alpha-1}(\boldsymbol{\mu}_{,\alpha}^{T}\mathbf{b}_{\beta})\mathbf{b}_{\beta}}{\sqrt{\boldsymbol{\mu}_{,\alpha}^{T}\mathbf{C}^{-1}\boldsymbol{\mu}_{,\alpha} - \sum_{\beta=1}^{\alpha-1}(\boldsymbol{\mu}_{,\alpha}^{T}\mathbf{b}_{\beta})^{2}}} \quad 1 < \alpha \le m, \end{split}$$

Size of dataset reduced massively to the number of parameters.

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Size of dataset reduced massively to the number of parameters.
 Same Fisher Matrix! F<sub>αβ</sub> ≡ -⟨∂<sup>2</sup> ln ℒ/∂θ<sub>α</sub>∂θ<sub>β</sub>⟩

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
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
- **2** Same Fisher Matrix!  $F_{\alpha\beta} \equiv -\langle \partial^2 \ln \mathcal{L} / \partial \theta_{\alpha} \partial \theta_{\beta} \rangle$
- MOPED (originally proposed for a different purpose) can solve the simulations problem: Heavens et al (2017) and Gualdi et al (2018).

## MOPED performance



## Is the likelihood Gaussian?

The data are not Gaussian-distributed, even when the CLT handwave suggests otherwise...



Sellentin & Heavens (2018).

## Non-Gaussian Likelihoods

A major challenge

#### 3 approaches

Edgeworth expansion Approximate likelihood Bayesian Hierarchical Models

# Edgeworth Expansion

#### Joint distribution of all Fourier coefficients ak

Schematically:

$$p(a_{\mathbf{k}}|\theta) = |\text{diag}[2\pi P(k)]|^{-1/2} \exp\left[-\frac{|a_{\mathbf{k}}|^2}{2P(k)}\right] \{1 + B + T + B^2 + ...\}$$

 $P(k, \theta), B(\mathbf{k}, \theta), T(\mathbf{k}, \theta) =$  power spectrum, bispectrum, trispectrum.




Figure: Sellentin, Jaffe, Heavens 2018

Other ideas: gaussianising transforms (e.g. Hall & Mead 2018), clipping (Simpson et al. 2011)

Alan Heavens (ICIC, Imperial College)

## Approximate Likelihood and Posterior

Machine-learning techniques: Approximate Bayesian Computation

#### ABC

Posterior: Rejection-sampling ABC.

Run many simulations.

Keep those that match the data.

Match: not everything, but match some summary statistics.


Very expensive

#### Fit the likelihood

Fit the sampling distribution  $p(d|\theta)$  of mocks. e.g. Hahn et al (2018) Feasible in relatively small numbers of dimensions Probably impossible in very high dimensions Data compression needed again Fitting the joint p(data, parameters)

#### Fit $p(d, \theta)$

Use machine learning techniques such as GMM, KDE. Alsing et al. (2018)



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#### BHM

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- At each step ideally we will know the conditional distributions
- The aim is to build a complete model of the data
- Principled way to include systematic errors, selection effects (everything, really)

A simple example

Often used to learn about a *population* from many *individual measurements*. e.g. we measure the fluxes  $\hat{f}_i$  of a population of galaxies, but the? have errors. What are the true number counts?

• Assume (say) a power-law  $N \propto f^{-lpha}$ 



Figure: Ned Wright

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
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- Assume (say) a power-law  $N\propto f^{-lpha}$
- Many (unobserved) true fluxes  $\theta_i$
- Add noise:  $\hat{f}_i = \theta_i + n_i$




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
### Number counts



### Latent Variables




## Ordinary Bayes vs Hierarchical Bayes



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


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## Ordinary Bayes vs Hierarchical Bayes



• Ordinary Bayes:

$$p(lpha|\hat{f}) \propto p(\hat{f}|lpha) \, p(lpha)$$

- But we do not know  $p(\hat{f}|\alpha)!$
- Hierarchical Bayes:

$$p(\alpha, \theta | \hat{f}) \propto p(\hat{f} | \theta, \alpha) p(\theta, \alpha)$$
  
 
$$\propto p(\hat{f} | \theta, \alpha) p(\theta | \alpha) p(\alpha)$$
(1)

#### Computing the posterior

 $p(\theta|d)$  may be impossible to calculate directly e.g.  $p(\text{cosmology parameters } \theta|\text{shapes of galaxies } d)$ Solution: make the problem MUCH harder: Compute the joint probability of the cosmological parameters *and the shear map* 

#### Joint distribution

$$\mathrm{p}( heta \, | \, \mathrm{d}) = \int \mathrm{p}( heta, \mathrm{map} \, | \, \mathrm{d}) \, \mathrm{d}(\mathrm{map})$$
 $\mathrm{p}( heta, \mathrm{map} \, | \, \mathrm{d}) \propto \mathcal{L}(\mathrm{d} \, | \, heta, \mathrm{map}) \, \mathrm{p}(\mathrm{map} | \, heta) \, \pi( heta)$ 


### Joint map, parameter sampling

#### Latent parameters

Each pixel in the map is a parameter 10 cosmological parameters, plus 1,000,000 shear values One million-dimensional probability distribution to calculate


# Sampling

• MCMC: Metropolis-Hastings fails since it is very hard to devise an efficient proposal distribution




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


# Sampling

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- Gibbs sampling: effective if conditional distributions are known
- Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) works in very high dimensions (e.g. STAN)



Weak Lensing BHM: Forward Model or Generative Model





s = shear map

N = noise variance in each pixel

d = noisy shear estimates in each pixel


## CFHTLenS

Alsing, AFH et al (2016).  $\sim$  130,000 parameters; Gibbs sampling

### BORG and SDSS

## Weak lensing: CFHTLenS maps


Alsing, Heavens & Jaffe (2017).  $\sim$  250,000 parameters; Gibbs sampling





### Weak Lensing BHM: Forward Model or Generative Model

Add in elements: uncertainties in redshifts, intrinsic alignments, etc



# CFHTLenS weak lensing

Band powers

Make *EE*, *BB*, *EB* mode bandpowers the parameters (cosmology-independent)





Figure: Alsing, AFH et al (2016)

# CFHTLenS cosmological parameters



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- including a proper treatment of systematics
- One can often use efficient sampling algorithms to sample from the posterior precisely what one wants from a Bayesian statistical analysis

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- The sort of question asked here is often 'Do the data favour a more complex model?'
- Clearly in the latter type of comparison the likelihood itself will be of no use it will always increase if we allow more freedom.

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$$p(\theta|d, M) = \frac{p(d|\theta, M)\pi(\theta|M)}{p(d|M)}$$

• The Bayesian Evidence normalises the posterior, so is

$$p(d|M) = \int d\theta \, p(d|\theta, M) \pi(\theta|M)$$

p(d|M) may not be large (but it is for  $\Lambda$ CDM)




Figure: The Planck power spectrum, with the theoretical model with best fitting cosmological parameters.

Alan Heavens (ICIC, Imperial College)

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- Rule 1: Write down what you want to know.
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$$\frac{p(M'|d)}{p(M|d)} = \frac{\pi(M')}{\pi(M)} \frac{\int d\theta' \, p(d|\theta', M') \pi(\theta'|M')}{\int d\theta \, p(d|\theta, M) \pi(\theta|M)}$$

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• With uninformative priors on the models, p(M') = p(M), this ratio simplifies to the ratio of evidences, called the **Bayes Factor**,

$$B \equiv \frac{\int d\theta' \, p(d|\theta', M') \, \pi(\theta'|M')}{\int d\theta \, p(d|\theta, M) \, \pi(\theta|M)}$$

The Kass & Raftery scale

In <i>B</i>	Interpretation	
< 1	not worth more than a bare mention	
-		
1 to 3	positive	
3 to 5	strong	
> 5	very strong	

But better to stick with probabilities rather than descriptions.

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- We further assume that it is *nested* in Model M', i.e. the n' parameters of model M' are common to M, which has  $p \equiv n n'$  extra parameters in it. These parameters are fixed to fiducial values in M'.
- Note that the more complicated model *M* will (if *M*' is nested) inevitably lead to a higher likelihood (or at least as high), but the evidence may favour the simpler model if the fit is nearly as good, through the smaller prior volume.

 We assume uniform (and hence separable) priors in each parameter, over ranges Δθ (or Δθ'). Hence p(θ|M) = (Δθ<sub>1</sub>...Δθ<sub>n</sub>)<sup>-1</sup>

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- Assume prior range includes (virtually) all the likelihood.
- In the nested case, the ratio of prior hypervolumes simplifies to

$$\frac{\Delta\theta_1\dots\Delta\theta_n}{\Delta\theta'_1\dots\Delta\theta'_{n'}} = \Delta\theta_{n'+1}\dots\Delta\theta_{n'+p},$$

where  $p \equiv n - n'$  is the number of extra parameters in the more complicated model.

Challenges: The evidence requires a multidimensional integration over the likelihood and prior, and this may be *very* expensive to compute.

• Nested sampling (multinest, polychord), where one tries to sample the likelihood in an efficient way.

### Bayesian Evidence

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- MCEvidence may be useful for computing Evidence from pre-existing MCMC chains

### Gaussian Example

## Assume everything is gaussian Let $M_0$ be $d \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ , and $M_1$ be $d \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ , where the prior on $\mu$ is gaussian with zero mean and variance $\Sigma^2$ . Let the measurement be

is gaussian with zero mean and variance  $\Sigma^2$ . Let the measurement be  $d = \lambda \sigma$ .

$$p_1(d|\mu) = rac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma} e^{-(d-\mu)^2/(2\sigma^2)}$$

and

$$p_1(\mu|d) = rac{p_1(d|\mu) \, \pi_1(\mu)}{p_1(d)} = rac{p_1(d|\mu) \, \pi_1(\mu)}{\int p_1(d|\mu) \, \pi_1(\mu) d\mu}$$

### Gaussian Example

Hence

$$BF_{01} = \frac{p_1(d|\mu=0)\pi_1(\mu=0)}{p_1(d)}$$

i.e.,

$$BF_{01} = \frac{\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}}e^{-d^{2}/(2\sigma^{2})} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\Sigma}}}{\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\Sigma}}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}e^{-(d-\mu)^{2}/(2\sigma^{2})}e^{-\mu^{2}/(2\Sigma^{2})}d\mu}$$

SO

$$BF_{01} = \sqrt{1 + \frac{\Sigma^2}{\sigma^2}} \exp\left[-\frac{\lambda^2}{2(1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{\Sigma^2})}\right]$$

### Gaussian Example

$$BF_{01} = \sqrt{1 + \frac{\Sigma^2}{\sigma^2}} \exp\left[-\frac{\lambda^2}{2(1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{\Sigma^2})}\right]$$

If  $\lambda \gg 1$ , then  $B_{01} \ll 1$  and  $M_1$  is favoured. If  $\lambda \simeq 1$  and  $\sigma \ll \Sigma$ , then  $M_0$  is favoured (Occam's razor). If likelihood is much broader than prior,  $\sigma \gg \Sigma$  then  $BF_{01} \simeq 1$  and nothing has been learned.




Figure: The Bayes Factor for a gaussian likelihood (variance  $\sigma^2$ ), and a gaussian prior (variance  $\Sigma^2$ ). The x axis =log<sub>10</sub>( $\Sigma/\sigma$ ); the y axis is datum/ $\sigma$ . From Trotta (2008).



• Bayesian formalism can easily be generalised to model comparison


### Summary

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- Resulting integrals over parameter space may be challenging to compute
- Evidence ratios have sensitivity to the prior, even asymptotically


# Planck parameter inference Assuming ACDM




Alan Heavens (ICIC, Imperial College)

CosmoBack

### Extensions to **ACDM**



# **BAYESIAN EVIDENCE: WHICH MODELS** ARE PREFERRED? PLANCK TT, TE, EE DATA




7. Running of ns


20. Sterile neutrinos

#### Figure: Heavens et al 2107

#### **Planck tensions**



### Extensions to ACDM WITH CMB LENSING



21. Sterile neutrinos and r

### State of Play

#### Analysis of Planck chains using MCEvidence (Heavens et al 2017)




Figure: The Bayes Factor for Planck

### Planck Dark Energy Equation of State

$$Planck+BSH$$

$$Planck+WL$$

$$Planck+WL+BAO/RSD$$

$$Planck+WL+BAO/RSD$$

$$Planck+WL+BAO/RSD$$

$$-1$$

$$-2$$

$$-3$$

$$-2$$


$$-1$$

$$0$$

$$W_0$$

 $w(a) = w_0 + w_a(a-1).$ 

### Forecasting the future



### Conclusions

- Assuming that data are gaussian-distributed will almost certainly not be good enough
- For likelihood-free parameter inference, or for approximating sampling distributions, massive data compression will also be necessary
- MOPED offers a way to do this without loss of information
- Bayesian Hierarchical Modelling is the principled solution to the analysis challenge
- For models that make subtly different predictions from ACDM, a very careful analysis will be necessary, including careful treatment of systematics and full propagation of errors
- Marginalising over uncertain parameters weakens sensitivity to new physics
- Model comparison may struggle to prefer non-ΛCDM models in future with high probability, unless we make new types of observation